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COMMENTARY
BENNIS AND THE WAR AGAINST DRUGS
George E. Ward*
The United States Supreme Court recently rejected a claim that the
Constitution prevents a state sanction for violations of assumed owner-
ship obligations that occur without the owner's actual knowledge or con-
sent.1 In Bennis v. Michigan,2 Tina Bennis asked the Court to overturn
the Michigan Supreme Court's ruling that her interest in the family car
could be abated as a public nuisance after her husband used the vehicle to
solicit a prostitute.3 Mrs. Bennis argued that Michigan's nuisance abate-
ment scheme violated her Fourteenth Amendment Due Process rights or,
alternatively, that Michigan unconstitutionally seized her property for
public use without just compensation in violation of the Fifth Amend-
ment Takings Clause.4 The Court agreed with the Michigan Supreme
Court that the nuisance abatement statute did not violate Mrs. Bennis's
constitutionally protected property rights.5
In the majority opinion, Chief Justice Rehnquist explained that neither
the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause nor the Fifth Amend-
ment Takings Clause prevented Michigan from keeping the proceeds
* Chief Assistant Prosecuting Attorney for Wayne County, Michigan, and a counsel
of record for the state in Bennis v. Michigan. Mr. Ward is a 1966 graduate of the Univer-
sity of Michigan Law School and an Adjunct Professor of Law (State and Local Govern-
ment) at the Detroit College of Law at Michigan State University.
1. See Bennis v. Michigan, 116 S. Ct. 994 (1996).
2. Id
3. See id. at 997-98. The Michigan Supreme Court ruled that Michigan need not
prove that Mrs. Bennis knew of or acquiesced to her husband's illegal use of the vehicle.
See id.
4. See id. Mrs. Bennis contested the abatement on due process grounds by arguing
that "she did not know her husband would use [the car] to violate Michigan's indecency
law." Id. at 998.
5. See id. at 998 (noting that Supreme Court precedent illustrates that "an owner's
interest in property may be forfeited by reason of the use to which the property is put even
though the owner did not know that it was to be put to such use"); id. at 1001 (ruling that
there is no taking under the Fifth Amendment where the government lawfully acquires the
property "under the exercise of government authority other than the power of eminent
domain").
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from the sale of the Bennis car.6 The Chief Justice first determined that
the use of civil forfeiture laws to fight crime was "'too firmly fixed... to
be now displaced.' 7 The Chief Justice then disposed of Mrs. Bennis's
Fifth Amendment claim by explaining that Michigan did not have to com-
pensate her for the seizure because the state lawfully acquired title to the
vehicle under the nuisance abatement statute, rather than by exercising
its eminent domain powers.8
Justice Ginsburg and Justice Thomas joined in the majority opinion,
but wrote concurring opinions.9 Justice Ginsburg found that Michigan
did not unfairly apply the nuisance abatement law to Mrs. Bennis in light
of the statute's important crime fighting objectives, and explained that
"the State's Supreme Court stands ready to police exorbitant applications
of the statute."1 Justice Thomas wrote separately to address the lack of
clarity regarding the scope of forfeiture law; he concluded that forfeiture
may be improper where an innocent owner's property was not an "instru-
mentality" of the crime."
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Souter and
Breyer, made no distinction between "abatement" and "forfeiture," but
attempted to distinguish the Court's prior forfeiture decisions. 2 Justice
Stevens disagreed that Michigan could forfeit Mrs. Bennis's property in-
terest, arguing that the car did not facilitate Mr. Bennis's criminal activ-
ity. 3 Alternatively, he argued that the civil forfeiture doctrine required
proof that the owner negligently entrusted the property to the criminal
wrongdoer.1
4
THE PROSECUTOR'S PERSPECTIVE
Unfortunately, the term "abatement" is as vague as a Rorschach Test.
Opponents of civil forfeiture can see in it whatever they choose to see.
While the majority of the Supreme Court in Bennis favored Detroit's
campaign to drive vice crime off its streets as an "abatement endeavor
6. See id. at 998, 1001; see also supra note 5.
7. Id. at 999.
8. See id. at 1001.
9. See id. at 1003 (Ginsburg, J., concurring); id. at 1001 (Thomas, J., concurring).
10. See id. at 1003 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
11. See id. at 1002. (Thomas, J., concurring).
12. See generally id. at 1004-07 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that because of "the
tenuous connection between the property forfeited ... and the illegal act that was intended
to be punished," this case may be distinguished from this Court's long line of forfeiture
holdings).
13. See id. at 1005-06 ("[T]he forfeited property bore no necessary connection to the
offense committed by petitioner's husband.").
14. See id. at 1007-09.
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[that] hardly warrants this Court's disapprobation,""5 dissenting justices
denounced it, asserting, "Fundamental fairness prohibits the punishment
of innocent people.' 16 The holding unleashed a torrent of media criti-
cism 17 that treated a wholly reasonable sales order in the nature of parti-
tion" as if it were a government burglary.
WHAT REALLY WAS AT ISSUE IN BEvNIs?
Detroit has two programs aimed at suppressing vice-markets in its
neighborhoods. The first, PUSH-OFF,9 targets recreational drug buyers.
The second, Operation Save Our Neighborhood,20 targets "johns," the
customers of prostitution. Both are demand-side enforcement programs,
and rest on the proposition that no person has a right to use a vehicle on
public streets to facilitate vice-markets in goods or services. They operate
under different statutes, but similarly.
When a police officer has probable cause to believe that the driver of a
vehicle is seeking to purchase drugs or sex, the officer seizes the car, an-
nounces an intent to begin court proceedings to extinguish the owner's
interest, and advises the driver that further discussion about trial pro-
ceedings or possible settlement must be taken up with the prosecutor.
Since the programs were instituted, over 13,450 vehicles have been seized
in Wayne County, Michigan; challenges to the seizures have been brought
in only 225 cases; the prosecutor's standard settlement terms have gener-
ated almost $5.3 million for enhanced law enforcement; and the recidi-
vism rate for these offenders is less than two percent.2 '
The Bennis case grew out of Detroit's anti-prostitution campaign, Op-
eration Save Our Neighborhood.22 On October 3, 1988, in a 1977 Pontiac
15. Id. at 1003 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
16. Id. at 1007 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
17. See, e.g., George E. Ward, Checkout Time For Balancing the Budget, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 13, 1996, at A18 (Letter to the Editor); Editorial, Government's Grand Seizures, DE-
TROIT NEWS, Mar. 13, 1996, at 8A; Nasty Attack of Seizure, TIME, Mar. 18, 1996, at 80;
Nation's Founders Would Gasp at Court's Stance, USA TODAY, Mar. 5, 1996, at 10A;
Debra Saunders, High Court Takes Low Road on Forfeiture, DETROIT FREE PRESS, Mar.
13, 1996 at 9A; David G. Savage, Innocence Punished, A.B.A. J., May 1996, at 47; George
Will, High Court Deals a Setback to Property Rights, CHICAGO SUN-TIMES, Mar. 10, 1996,
at 40.
18. See Godfrey v. White, 27 N.W. 593, 595 (Mich. 1886) ("Courts of equity have ex-
clusive jurisdiction of suits for partition of personal property.").
19. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 333.7521 (West 1987); id. § 600.3801; see also 'Cus-
tomers' Risk Losing Their Cars, DETROIT NEWS, June 13, 1995, at 5D.
20. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.3801.
21. See Records of the Wayne County Prosecutor's Office (on file with author).
22. Over sixty percent of the 'johns' and other customers of vice markets operating in
Detroit are non-residents, and over ninety percent are non-residents of the particular
1996]
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automobile, John Bennis patronized a well-known vice market for prosti-
tution on Sheffield Street in north central Detroit.23 The evidence indi-
cated that Mr. Bennis was a repeat customer of the market, although he
had not previously used the 1977 Pontiac.24 Officers of the Detroit vice
section arrested Mr. Bennis for gross indecency, and seized the automo-
bile, which he and his wife jointly owned.25 Upon confirming Mr. Ben-
nis's one-half ownership interest in the automobile, the Wayne County
Prosecutor filed an abatement claim.26
Under Michigan law, a vehicle may be abated if it can be established
that the vehicle was used to continue27 an open and notorious nuisance.28
If abated, the court can fashion an appropriate equitable remedy. In our
experience, Michigan courts handling co-tenancy cases typically impose a
forfeiture order that is limited to the culpable party's interest, an equita-
ble approach. 29 In Bennis, Justice Ginsburg took particular pains to eval-
uate Operation Save Our Neighborhood for evenhandedness.3" Upon
demonstration of the fairness of this anti-prostitution program, Justice
neighborhood suffering the unpleasantness. See Statistics Regarding Solicitation Citations
(July 1-31, 1996) (on file with author).
23. See Michigan ex rel. Wayne County Prosecutor v. Bennis, 527 N.W.2d 483, 486
(Mich. 1994).
24. See id. at 488 (noting that two separate witnesses had seen Mr. Bennis talking with
prostitutes on three occasions).
25. See id. at 486. A vehicle title had been issued in the names of both husband and
wife. At oral argument before the Supreme Court, Mrs. Bennis analogized the nature of
the ownership to a tenancy in common. See Official Transcript Proceedings at 3-10, Bennis
v. Michigan, 116 S. Ct. 994 (1996) (No. 94-8729); Bennis v. Michigan, 116 S. Ct. 994, 1003
(1996) (Ginsburg, J., concurring). "The sole question, then, is whether Tina Bennis is enti-
tled not to the car, but to a portion of the proceeds (if any there be after deduction of
police, prosecutorial, and court costs) as a matter of constitutional right." Id.
26. See Complaint for Abatement of Public Nuisance (No. 88-824379 CZ), reprinted in
Joint Appendix at 2-6, Bennis v. Michigan, 116 S. Ct. 994 (1996) (No. 94-8729).
27. See Bennis, 527 N.W.2d at 491 ("Vehicles that enter the neighborhood in order to
solicit acts of prostitution are being 'used for' the continuance of this nuisance.").
28. See MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 600.3825 (West 1987).
29. Under Michigan law, the ownership of husband and wife in personal property, like
an automobile, may be a tenancy in common. See DeYoung v. Mesler, 130 N.W.2d 38, 40-
41 (Mich. 1964) (Souris, J., dissenting); John F. MacArthur & George C. Cabot, Tax As-
pects of Creating Non-Spousal Joint Tenancies, 65 Mich. B.J. 706, 707 n.20 (1986). When
dividing a tenancy in common, the Michigan term for the equitable remedy involved is
partition, not forfeiture. Cf. MICH. Cr. R. 3.403 (providing for a forced sale of a real estate
asset and a division of proceeds as a substitute for partition). Even where Michigan law
allows cars used to facilitate drug crimes to be forfeited, it expressly recognizes an "inno-
cent owner's" defense. See MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 333.7521(1)(d)(ii) (West 1992). In
practical effect, there is no difference between a sales order of partition and a forfeiture
order that is limited to the offending party's interest.
30. See Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 1003 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
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Ginsburg refused to assume an "inequitable administration of an equita-
ble [remedy]."'"
The Wayne County Prosecutor created Operation Save Our Neighbor-
hood in response to a demand by residents of north central Detroit for
relief from the blighting effects of vice.32 The program is as solicitous of
the constitutional rights of "johns" and the owners of the cars the johns
drive as it is of the prostitutes and neighborhood residents. For example,
the standard first-offender's settlement offer in the case of seized vehicles
is $650. 33 If an owner chooses trial, the burden of proof is on the
County.34 If the owner wins at trial, the car is returned and the City may
be assessed costs.35 The Bennises probably did not find a voluntary set-
tlement attractive because the seized car had been purchased earlier for
only $600.36 They chose trial and lost.
At trial on the claim for abatement, the judge commented on each of
three competing interests: those of neighborhood residents, prostitutes,
and the Bennises.
Neighborhood Residents
The officer himself said ... he has made three arrests in this
immediate area. One extrapolates from that testimony that he
... has assisted other officers in making arrests....
Miss Kirksey indicated a necessity has arisen for the creation
of a CB patrol in the area of the Green Acres ... in the months
of July, August and September, there were some 32 observations
At all times, day and night, every day, 365 days of the year,
... [Mrs. Wilson] ... has had to... put up with the acts and
frustrations of those engaging in some forms of [prostitution] ac-
31. See id. at 1003 ("It shows no respect for Michigan's high court to attribute to its
members tolerance of, or insensitivity to, inequitable administration of an equitable
action.").
32. The Detroit Police Department's Eleventh Precinct Police-Community Relations
Council was amicus curiae in a brief filed by the General Counsel of the American Alli-
ance For Rights and Responsibilities in Washington, D.C. Brief for the American Alliance
for Rights and Responsibilities, Bennis v. Michigan, 116 S. Ct. 994 (1996) (No. 94-8729).
33. See Settlement Terms of the Wayne County Prosecutor's Office (on file with
author).
34. See Michigan ex rel. Wayne County Prosecutor v. Bennis, 527 N.W.2d 483, 489
(Mich. 1994).
35. See MICH. CT. R. 2.625(A) (1996).
36. See Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 997 (noting that the car had been purchased by the Ben-
nises for $600).
19961
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tivity in front of her home . . . [she] cannot even walk along
Eight Mile Road now;... even when she wants to go for a little
walk in the morning, she has to have her husband trailing be-
hind her .... 37
The Prostitutes
[W]e [male judges] are insensitive .... [P]ut the prostitutes in
jail .... [and] [n]o one sheds a tear, but let the john run the risk
of the loss of some of his property, and everybody cries, "How
harsh, how severe a remedy."
... It's classic chauvinism and sexism where we are so con-
cerned about.., mere property loss versus the loss of one's [the
prostitute's] freedom ... 38
The Bennises
Finally, the trial judge, as Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion noted,
found that the Bennises owned another automobile, so they would not be
left without transportation.39 Moreover, although Michigan trial courts
may partition proceeds from the sale of a co-owned vehicle and order
payment of one-half to "the innocent co-title holder,"4 in this instance,
the trial judge believed this authority should be exercised on a net basis,
finding that, given "the age and value of the car ... [t]here's practically
nothing left minus costs in a situation such as this."41
The Bennises did not dispute the Court's finding that there would be
no net sales proceeds to divide between the interest holders.42 At the
time, the charge to tow a vehicle off the street was $75 and to store it was
$8 per day. The state of Michigan charged $11 to transfer title to a buyer
at auction. The salvage company charged $60 to hold the auction.43
Forty-three days had already elapsed by the entry of the trial court's or-
der.44 Given these unit costs, the trial judge properly estimated expenses
37. Transcript of Bench Ruling of Trial Court at 181-84, reprinted in Joint Appendix at
15-18, Bennis v. Michigan, 116 S. Ct. 994 (1996) (No. 94-8729).
38. See Transcript of Bench Ruling of Trial Court at 192-93, reprinted in Joint Appen-
dix at 24-25.
39. See Transcript of Bench Ruling of Trial Court at 193, reprinted in Joint Appendix
at 25; see also Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 997.
40. See Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 997.
41. See id.
42. See Official Transcript Proceedings at 7, Bennis v. Michigan, 116 S. Ct. 994 (1996)
(No. 94-8729).
43. Information furnished by Vice Enforcement Section, Detroit Police Department.
44. The Complaint was filed October 4,1988, and the judgment entered November 16,
1988. See Complaint for Abatement of Public Nuisance, (No. 88-824379 CZ), reprinted in
Joint Appendix at 2-6, Bennis v. Michigan, 116 S. Ct. 994 (1996) (No. 94-8729); Order of
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in the Bennis case to be in excess of the car's value. Meanwhile, the blue
book value for the 1977 Pontiac was only $450.41 Clearly, the sale pro-
ceeds from the aging vehicle were so small, both ownership shares-the
husband's to which the state succeeded and Mrs. Bennis's-would have
been consumed by cost.
THE ISSUE BEFORE THE MICHIGAN COURTS
In Michigan, the Bennises resisted any form of abatement order, argu-
ing that even assuming the truthfulness of the prosecutor's allegations, a
once-only use of a motor vehicle to patronize an open and notorious vice
market should not make it "abatable" under the Michigan statute.46 If
that position had been upheld, the entire strategy of Operation Save Our
Neighborhood would have been crippled. Unfortunately, from our point
of view, the Michigan Court of Appeals did uphold it,47 and during the
appeal to the state Supreme Court, Detroit's anti-prostitution campaign
was suspended. Ultimately, the Michigan Supreme Court rejected the
statutory challenge:
Where testimony surrounding proof of an incident of prostitu-
tion unequivocally establishes that the neighborhood has a repu-
tation for prostitution, the property contributing to the
continuance of the nuisance may be abated pursuant to the stat-
ute. To hold otherwise would allow the criminal actors to cir-
cumvent the statute where a different vehicle was used in the
commission of each offense. The result would permit the contin-
uing blight of neighborhoods, contrary to the clear intent of the
statute.4S
Rejecting the contention that the Michigan statute, as so construed,
would violate the due process rights of the co-owner who was innocent of
the prostitution offense, the Michigan Supreme Court accepted the view
that obligations assumed upon becoming an auto owner can be enforced,
even as to later harms that the owner has no part in causing.49
Abatement (No. 88-824379 CZ), reprinted in Joint Appendix at 27-28, Bennis v. Michigan,
116 S. Ct. 994 (1996) (No. 94-8729).
45. See National Auto Dealers' Ass'n, N.A.D.A Appraisal Guide: Official Older Used
Car Guide C-73 (James H. Lawrence et al. eds., 1988).
46. See Michigan ex rel. Wayne County Prosecutor v. Bennis, 527 N.W.2d 483, 489-92
(Mich. 1994); Michigan ex rel. Wayne County Prosecutor v. Bennis, 504 N.W.2d 731,733-34
(Mich. Ct. App. 1993).
47. See Bennis, 504 N.W.2d at 732.
48. See Bennis, 527 N.W.2d at 492 (emphasis added).
49. See id. at 494. "It is clear that the abatement of property stolen from the owner or
taken without the owner's knowledge would be prohibited. However, on the basis of the
facts before us, the argument cannot be made that the vehicle was stolen or initially driven
without Mrs. Bennis' knowledge." Id.
1996]
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Later, Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion recognized a parallel between
Mrs. Bennis's attempt to avoid an assumed responsibility by pleading "in-
nocence" and what personal-injury defendants attempted in the early
part of this century when automobiles first appeared on the scene. In the
1917 Michigan case of Stapleton v. Independent Brewing Co. ,o for exam-
ple, the defendant asserted a defense of "innocence," arguing that if the
statute "impose[s] a liability upon the owner of an automobile for an acci-
dent happening through its operation whether the owner is at fault or
not," then it "would violate both the federal and state Constitutions."51
But this kind of argument was rejected long ago. Chief Justice Rehnquist
noted:
[B]ecause Michigan also deters dangerous driving by making a
motor vehicle owner liable for the negligent operation of the
vehicle by a driver who had the owner's consent to use it, peti-
tioner was also potentially liable for her husband's use of the car
in violation of Michigan negligence law. "The law [requiring as-
sumption of ownership responsibility] thus builds a secondary
defense against a forbidden use and precludes evasions by dis-
pensing with the necessity of judicial inquiry as to collusion be-
tween the wrongdoer and the alleged innocent owner."52
This historical example of attempts to escape an assumed obligation
conjures up the delicious irony of a hypothetical lawyer who, if retained
by the wife of a "john" to oppose an abatement, could wax indignant
about the injustice of an innocent owner losing a $300 interest. If re-
tained by the prostitute, however, to sue the wife for personal injury
caused by the co-owned vehicle, the same lawyer, despite the wife's inno-
cence in the same degree, might seek to impose monetary damages of an
untold amount on her, with the dismissive attitude toward "innocence"
exhibited by plaintiff's lawyer in Stapleton.
Because the wife's innocence would not immunize the husband's half
interest from abatement, it was clear that a hostile co-ownership between
the state and Mrs. Bennis resulted from the husband's conduct. The trial
judge chose to partition the two half-interests by ordering the sale of the
vehicle, rather than forfeiting the vehicle in kind to the state.53 As the
incidental expenses exceeded the proceeds, neither interest holder re-
ceived anything.
50. 164 N.W. 520 (Mich. 1917).
51. Id. at 521.
52. Bennis v. Michigan, 116 S. Ct. 994, 1000-01 (1996) (emphasis added) (citations
omitted).
53. See Transcript of Bench Ruling of Trial Court at 188, (No. 88-824-379 CZ), re-
printed in Joint Appendix at 21, Bennis v. Michigan, 116 S. Ct. 994 (1996) (No. 94-8729)
(emphasizing the trial court's discretion to shape an appropriate remedy).
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How THE Focus OF THE DISPUTE CHANGED
Only the wife appealed the Michigan abatement order to the United
States Supreme Court.54 When our office heard that the Supreme Court
had issued its writ of certiorari for a "big test" case of forfeiture, we at the
Wayne County Prosecutor's Office were, to say the least, surprised.
It was clearly the triumph of semantics over substance. Not only is the
word "forfeiture" absent from the trial court order, the order uses the
word "abate" in a context that clearly means "forced sale." The text of
the state court order reads:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the 1977 Pontiac, jointly
owned by JOHN CHARLES BENNIS and TINA B. BENNIS,
for those reasons fully stated by this Court on the record made
on the trial date, is a public nuisance and that said vehicle shall
be abated as provided by the controlling statute.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT the proceeds derived
from the sale of said vehicle pursuant to statute shall be dis-
posed of in the following order of priority: the filing fee of this
action shall be returned to the Office of the Wayne County Pros-
ecutor, all police costs shall be paid to the Detroit Police De-
partment, all attorney costs shall be paid to the Office of the
Wayne County Prosecutor ....
Responding to a question Justice Ginsburg asked at oral argument,
counsel for Mrs. Bennis quickly made clear that her case was really noth-
ing more than a challenge to the net proceeds rule.56 If a division of gross
proceeds was not required, he insisted with much heat, Mrs. Bennis's
one-half interest must be deemed to be a forfeiture.57 Thus, instead of
treating it as a simple question of how to apply proceeds in a co-owner-
ship case, it reached the high court as an alleged violation of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments.
The Michigan decision in Bennis did not lead logically to the position
taken by Mrs. Bennis's lawyer. Responsibility for out-of-pocket expenses
inflicted on the public by a vehicle left on the street generally belongs to
the owner, apart from any claim of forfeiture. Because co-owners bear
54. See Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 994.
55. Order of Abatement, (No. 88-824-379 CZ), reprinted in Joint Appendix at 27-28,
Bennis v. Michigan, 116 S. Ct. 994 (1996) (No. 94-8729). The last phrase in the standard
form of abatement order used in Michigan courts, including the Bennis case, directs that
"any remaining balance shall be paid to the general treasury of the state of Michigan." See
id.
56. See Official Transcript Proceedings at 7, Bennis v. Michigan, 116 S. Ct. 994 (1996)
(No. 94-8729).
57. See Petitioner's Brief for Rehearing, Bennis v. Michigan, 116 S. Ct. 994 (1996)
(No. 94-8729) (filed Mar. 29, 1996).
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the expenses of a partition suit,58 Mrs. Bennis was required to pay the
expenses of removing and storing her car. This requirement is no more
remarkable than a situation in which a teenager illegally parks a parent's
car in a towing zone: to reclaim the car, the parent must pay out-of-
pocket expenses the public incurred in removing and storing the vehicle.
CONCLUSION
The Bennis case deserved a great deal of media attention, but not the
coverage it received. In a much-quoted statement, Justice Stevens de-
clared, "As far as I am aware . . . it was not until 1988 that any State
decided ... [to combat prostitution] by confiscating property in which, or
on which, a single transaction with a prostitute has been consummated."'5 9
Justice Stevens's comment seems inaccurate in several respects. Cer-
tainly, vehicles are confiscated regularly in single-transaction illegal-drug
cases. And, on the record in Bennis, Justice Stevens himself did not dis-
pute that, at the very least, the City of Detroit could succeed to the hus-
band's half-interest in the automobile, which alone would have
necessitated a forced sale. In the final analysis, this was simply a case,
decided correctly by the majority, about whether out-of-pockets expenses
caused by the removal, storage, and partition of a 1977 Pontiac had to be
borne by both owners, or just the municipal owner that had taken over
the husband's interest.
Significantly, the Bennis case's potential use for the fight against illegal
drugs has been ignored. While the Nation's policy of keeping dangerous
drugs illegal remains firm, and public officials founder in their search for
enforcement techniques that will achieve policy goals, no one has yet
taken note of this technique's success in bringing neighborhood relief or
its incredibly low two percent recidivism rate.6" It is a textbook example
of how swift and certain punishment deters crime. It is inexpensive, ex-
tremely effective, and could put real teeth in the "Just Say No" campaign
against demand.
Thus, if the Bennis case grabs headlines again, hopefully, it will be to
announce that its been "discovered" as an enforcement technique to sup-
port the policy of keeping drugs criminal in a way that is credible, propor-
tional, and does not burden the public treasury.
58. See MICH. CT. R. 3.403(d)(3); 59A AM. JUR. 2D Partition § 218 (1987).
59. Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 1003 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
60. See supra note 21.
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